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In December 2020, evidence began to emerge that a novel 
SARS-CoV-2 variant, Variant of Concern 202012/01 (lineage 
B.1.1.7, henceforth VOC 202012/01), was rapidly outcompet-
ing preexisting variants in southeast England (1). The vari-
ant increased in incidence during a national lockdown in 
November 2020, which was mandated in response to a pre-
vious and unrelated surge in COVID-19 cases, and continued 
to spread following the lockdown despite ongoing re-
strictions in many of the most affected areas. Concern over 
this variant led the UK government to enact stronger re-
strictions in these regions on 20 December 2020, and even-
tually to impose a third national lockdown on 5 January 
2021. As of 15 February 2021, VOC 202012/01 comprises 
roughly 95% of new SARS-CoV-2 infections in England, and 
has now been identified in at least 82 countries (2). Our cur-
rent understanding of effective pharmaceutical and non-
pharmaceutical control of SARS-CoV-2 does not reflect the 
epidemiological and clinical characteristics of VOC 
202012/01. Estimates of the growth rate, disease severity, 
and impact of this novel variant are crucial for informing 
rapid policy responses to this potential threat. 
 
Characteristics of the new variant 
VOC 202012/01 is defined by 17 mutations (14 non-
synonymous point mutations and 3 deletions), of which 
eight are in the spike protein, which mediates SARS-CoV-2 
attachment and entry into human cells. At least three muta-
tions potentially affect viral function. Mutation N501Y is a 
key contact residue in the receptor binding domain and en-
hances virus binding affinity to human angiotensin convert-
ing enzyme 2 (ACE2) (3, 4). Mutation P681H is immediately 
adjacent to the furin cleavage site in spike, a known region 
of importance for infection and transmission (5, 6). Deletion 
∆H69/∆V70 in spike has arisen in multiple independent 
lineages of SARS-CoV-2, is linked to immune escape in im-
munocompromised patients, and enhances viral infectivity 
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higher reproduction number than preexisting variants. A fitted two-strain dynamic transmission model 
shows that VOC 202012/01 will lead to large resurgences of COVID-19 cases. Without stringent control 
measures, including limited closure of educational institutions and a greatly accelerated vaccine roll-out, 
COVID-19 hospitalisations and deaths across England in 2021 will exceed those in 2020. Concerningly, 
VOC 202012/01 has spread globally and exhibits a similar transmission increase (59–74%) in Denmark, 
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in vitro (7, 8). This deletion is also responsible for certain 
commercial testing kits failing to detect the spike glycopro-
tein gene, with genomic data confirming these S gene target 
failures in England are now overwhelmingly due to the new 
variant (1). 
The proportion of COVID-19 cases attributable to VOC 
202012/01 is rapidly increasing in all regions of England, 
following an initial expansion in the South East (Fig. 1A), 
and is spreading at comparable rates among males and fe-
males and across age and socioeconomic strata (Fig. 1B). 
One potential explanation for the spread of VOC 202012/01 
within England is a founder effect: that is, if certain regions 
had higher levels of transmission as a result of more social 
interactions, variants that were more prevalent within these 
regions could become more common overall. Changes in 
social contact patterns correlate closely with changes in 
transmission (9) (Fig. 1, C and D) and with COVID-19 bur-
den in England (10). However, we did not find substantial 
differences in social interactions between regions of high 
and low VOC 202012/01 prevalence, as measured by Google 
mobility (11) and social contact survey data (12) from Sep-
tember to December 2020 (Fig. 1, E and F). Therefore, the 
apparent decoupling between contact rates and transmis-
sion in late 2020 may suggest altered transmission charac-
teristics for VOC 202012/01. 
 
Measuring the new variant’s growth rate 
VOC 202012/01 appears unmatched in its ability to outcom-
pete other SARS-CoV-2 lineages in England. Analyzing the 
COG-UK dataset (13), which comprises over 150,000 se-
quenced SARS-CoV-2 samples from across the UK, we found 
that the relative population growth rate of VOC 202012/01 
in the first 31 days following its initial phylogenetic observa-
tion was higher than that of all 307 other lineages with 
enough observations to obtain reliable growth-rate esti-
mates (Fig. 2A and fig. S1). While the relative growth rate of 
VOC 202012/01 has declined slightly over time, it remains 
among the highest of any lineage as a function of lineage 
age (Fig. 2B), and the lineage continues to expand. 
To quantify the growth advantage of VOC 202012/01, we 
performed a series of multinomial and logistic regression 
analyses on COG-UK data. A time-varying multinomial 
spline model estimates an increased growth rate for VOC 
202012/01 of +0.104 days−1 (95% CI 0.100–0.108) relative to 
the previously dominant lineage, B.1.177 (Table 1, model 1a; 
Fig. 2C and figs. S2 and S3). Assuming a generation interval 
of 5.5 days (14), this corresponds to a 77% (73–81%) increase 
in the reproduction number R. The growth advantage of 
VOC 202012/01 persists under more conservative model as-
sumptions (Table 1, model 1b; fig. S4), is consistent across 
all regions of the UK (table S1, model 2a; fig. S5), and is sim-
ilar when measured from S gene target failures among 
community COVID-19 tests instead of COG-UK sequence 
data (Table 1, model 2h; fig. S6). Data from other countries 
yield similar results: we estimate that R for VOC 202012/01 
relative to other lineages is 55% (45–66%) higher in Den-
mark, 74% (66–82%) higher in Switzerland, and 59% (56–
63%) higher in the United States, with consistent rates of 
displacement across regions within each country (Table 1, 
models 3a–c; figs. S6 and S7). 
As an alternative approach, we performed a regression 
analysis of previously-estimated reproduction numbers from 
case data against the frequency of S gene target failure in 
English upper-tier local authorities (Fig. 2D), using local 
control policies and mobility data as covariates and includ-
ing a time-varying spline to capture any unmeasured con-
founders. This yielded an estimated increase in R for VOC 
202012/01 of 43% (38–48%), increasing to a 57% (52–62%) 
increase if the spline was not included (Table 1, model 4a–
b). The various statistical models we fitted yield slightly dif-
ferent estimates for the growth rate of VOC 202012/01, re-
flecting different assumptions and model structures, but all 
identify a substantially increased growth rate (table S1). 
 
Mechanistic hypotheses for the rapid spread 
To understand possible biological mechanisms for why VOC 
202012/01 spreads more quickly than preexisting variants, 
we extended an age- and regionally-structured mathemati-
cal model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission (10, 15) to consider 
two co-circulating variants (fig. S8 and tables S2 and S3). 
The model uses Google mobility data (11), validated by social 
contact surveys (10), to capture changes in contact patterns 
over time for each region of England. We created five ver-
sions of the model, each including one alternative parame-
ter capturing a potential mechanism. 
The hypotheses we tested are as follows. First, observa-
tions of lower Ct values (16–18)—i.e., higher viral load—
support that VOC may be more transmissible per contact 
with an infectious person than preexisting variants (hypoth-
esis 1). Second, longitudinal testing data (17) suggest that 
VOC may be associated with a longer period of viral shed-
ding, and hence a potentially longer infectious period (hy-
pothesis 2). Third, the ∆H69/∆V70 deletion in spike 
contributed to immune escape in an immunocompromised 
patient (7), potentially suggesting that immunity to preexist-
ing variants affords reduced protection against infection 
with VOC (hypothesis 3). Fourth, that VOC initially spread 
during the November 2020 lockdown in England, during 
which schools were open, suggests that children may be 
more susceptible to infection with VOC than with preexist-
ing variants (hypothesis 4). Children are typically less sus-
ceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection than adults (19, 20), 
possibly because of immune cross-protection due to other 










First release: 3 March 2021  www.sciencemag.org  (Page numbers not final at time of first release) 3 
 
against VOC. Finally, VOC could have a shorter generation 
time than preexisting variants (hypothesis 5). A shorter gen-
eration time could account for an increased growth rate 
without requiring a higher reproduction number, which 
would make control of VOC 202012/01 via social distancing 
measures relatively easier to achieve. 
We fit each model to time series of COVID-19 deaths, 
hospital admissions, hospital and ICU bed occupancy, PCR 
prevalence, seroprevalence, and the proportion of communi-
ty SARS-CoV-2 tests with S gene target failure across the 
three most heavily affected NHS England regions, over the 
period of 1 March–24 December 2020 (Fig. 3 and figs. S9 to 
S14). We assess models using Deviance Information Criteria 
(DIC) and by comparing model predictions to observed data 
for the 14 days following the fitting period (i.e., 25 December 
2020–7 January 2021). Of the five hypotheses assessed, hy-
pothesis 1 (increased transmissibility) had the lowest (i.e., 
best) combined DIC and predictive deviance. Hypotheses 2 
(longer infectious period) and 4 (increased susceptibility in 
children) also fitted the data well, although hypothesis 4 is 
not well supported by household secondary attack rate data 
(fig. S15) or by age-specific patterns of S gene target failure 
in the community (fig. S16), neither of which identify a sub-
stantial increase in susceptibility among children. Hypothe-
ses 3 (immune escape) and 5 (shorter generation time) fit 
poorly (Fig. 3A and table S4). In particular, hypothesis 5 
predicted that the relative frequency of VOC 202012/01 
should have dropped during stringent restrictions in late 
December 2020, because when two variants have the same 
Rt < 1 but different generation times, infections decline fast-
er for the variant with the shorter generation time. 
We fitted a combined model incorporating the five hy-
potheses above, but it was not able to identify a single con-
sistent mechanism across NHS England regions, 
demonstrating that a wide range of parameter values are 
compatible with the observed growth rate of VOC 202012/01 
(fig. S14). Based on our analysis, we identify increased 
transmissibility as the most parsimonious model, but em-
phasize that the five mechanisms explored here are not mu-
tually exclusive and may be operating in concert. 
The increased transmissibility model does not identify a 
clear increase or decrease in the severity of disease associat-
ed with VOC 202012/01, finding similar odds of hospitalisa-
tion (estimated odds ratio of hospitalisation given infection, 
0.92 [95% credible intervals 0.77–1.10]), critical illness (OR 
0.90 [0.58–1.40]), and death (OR 0.90 [0.68–1.20]), based 
upon fitting to the three most heavily affected NHS England 
regions (Fig. 3B). These estimates should be treated with 
caution, as we would not expect to identify a clear signal of 
severity when fitting to data up to 24 December 2020, given 
delays between infection and hospitalization or death. How-
ever, the fitted model finds strong evidence of higher rela-
tive transmissibility, estimated at 65% (95% CrI: 39–93%) 
higher than preexisting variants for the three most heavily 
affected NHS England regions, or 82% (43–130%) when es-
timated across all seven NHS England regions (Table 1, 
model 5a). These estimates of increased transmissibility are 
consistent with our statistical estimates and with a previous 
estimate of a 70% increased reproduction number for VOC 
202012/01 (16). This model reproduces observed epidemio-
logical dynamics for VOC 202012/01 (Fig. 3C and fig. S17). 
Without the introduction of a new variant with a higher 
growth rate, the model is unable to reproduce observed dy-
namics (Fig. 3, D and E, and figs. S17 to S19), further high-
lighting that changing contact patterns do not explain the 
spread of VOC 202012/01. 
 
Implications for COVID-19 dynamics in England 
Using the best-performing transmission model (increased 
transmissibility) fitted to all seven NHS England regions, we 
compared projected epidemic dynamics under different as-
sumptions about control measures from mid-December 
2020 to the end of June 2021. We compared four scenarios 
for non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) introduced on 
1 January 2021: (i) a moderate-stringency scenario with mo-
bility levels as observed in the first half of October 2020; (ii) 
a high-stringency scenario with mobility levels as observed 
during the second national lockdown in England in Novem-
ber 2020, with schools open; (iii) the same high-stringency 
scenario, but with schools closed until 15 February 2021; 
and (iv) a very high-stringency scenario with mobility levels 
as observed during the first national lockdown in early April 
2020, with schools closed (fig. S20). In combination with 
these NPI scenarios, we considered three vaccination sce-
narios: no vaccinations; 200,000 vaccinations per week; and 
2 million vaccinations per week. We assumed that vaccine 
rollout starts on 1 January 2021 and that vaccinated indi-
viduals have a 95% lower probability of disease and a 60% 
lower probability of infection than unvaccinated individuals. 
For simplicity, we assumed that vaccine protection was con-
ferred immediately upon receipt of one vaccine dose. Note 
that these projections serve as indicative scenarios rather 
than formal predictive forecasts. 
Regardless of control measures, all regions of England 
were projected to experience a new wave of COVID-19 cases 
and deaths in early 2021, peaking in February 2021 if no 
substantial control measures are introduced, or in mid-
January 2021 if strong control measures succeeded in reduc-
ing R below 1 (Fig. 4A). In the absence of substantial vaccine 
roll-out, the number of COVID-19 cases, hospitalisations, 
ICU admissions and deaths in 2021 were predicted to exceed 
those in 2020, even with stringent NPIs in place (Table 2). 
Implementing more stringent measures in January 2021 
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simulated restrictions were lifted in March 2021, particular-
ly in those regions that had been least affected up to De-
cember 2020 (fig. S21). However, these more stringent 
measures may buy time to reach more widespread popula-
tion immunity through vaccination. Vaccine roll-out further 
mitigates transmission, although the impact of vaccinating 
200,000 people per week—similar in magnitude to the rates 
reached in December 2020—was relatively small (Fig. 4B 
and fig. S22). An accelerated uptake of 2 million people fully 
vaccinated per week (i.e., 4 million doses for a two-dose vac-
cine) had a much more substantial impact (Fig. 4C and fig. 
S23). However, accelerated vaccine roll-out has a relatively 
limited impact on peak burden, as the peak is largely medi-
ated by the stringency of NPIs enacted in January 2021, be-
fore vaccination has much of an impact. The primary 
benefit of accelerated vaccine roll-out lies in helping to avert 
a resurgence of cases following the relaxation of NPIs, and 
in reducing transmission after the peak burden has already 
been reached. 
As a sensitivity analysis, we also ran model projections 
with a seasonal component such that transmission is 20% 
higher in the winter than in the summer (22), but this did 
not qualitatively affect our results (fig. S24 and table S5). 
 
Discussion 
Combining multiple behavioral and epidemiological data 
sources with statistical and dynamic modelling, we estimat-
ed that the novel SARS-CoV-2 variant VOC 202012/01 has a 
43–90% (range of 95% credible intervals 38–130%) higher 
reproduction number than preexisting variants of SARS-
CoV-2 in England, assuming no changes to the generation 
interval. Based on early population-level data, we were una-
ble to identify whether the new variant is associated with 
higher disease severity. Theoretical considerations suggest 
that mutations conferring increased transmissibility to 
pathogens may be inextricably linked to reduced severity of 
disease (23). However, this framework assumes that a long 
history of adaptive evolution has rendered mutations yield-
ing increased transmissibility inaccessible without a de-
crease in virulence, which does not obviously hold for a 
recently emerged human pathogen such as SARS-CoV-2. 
Regardless, without strengthened controls, there is a clear 
risk that future epidemic waves may be larger—and hence 
associated with greater burden—than previous waves. The 
UK government initiated a third national lockdown on 5 
January 2021 in response to the rapid spread of VOC 
202012/01, including school closures. Educational settings 
are among the largest institutions linked to SARS-CoV-2 
clusters that remained open during the November 2020 
lockdown (24), which means the enacted school and univer-
sity closures may substantially assist in reducing the burden 
of COVID-19 in early 2021. 
The rise in transmission from VOC 202012/01 has cru-
cial implications for vaccination. First, it means prompt and 
efficient vaccine delivery and distribution is even more im-
portant to reduce the impact of the epidemic in the near 
future. Increased transmission resulting from VOC 
202012/01 will raise the herd immunity threshold, meaning 
the potential burden of SARS-CoV-2 is larger and higher 
vaccine coverage will be required to achieve herd immunity. 
It is therefore extremely concerning that VOC 202012/01 has 
spread to at least 82 countries globally (2). Although VOC 
202012/01 was first identified in England, a rapidly spread-
ing variant has also been detected in South Africa (25, 26), 
where there has been a marked increase in transmission in 
late 2020. Another variant exhibiting immune escape has 
emerged in Brazil (27, 28). Thus, vaccination timelines will 
also be a crucial determinant of future burden in other 
countries where similar new variants are present. Second, 
there is a need to assess how VOC 202012/01 and other 
emerging lineages affect the efficacy of vaccines (29, 30). 
Vaccine developers may need to consider developing formu-
lations with variant sequences, and powering post-licensure 
studies to detect differences in efficacy between the preex-
isting and new variants. Licensing authorities may need to 
clarify abbreviated pathways to marketing for vaccines that 
involve altering strain formulation without any other 
changes to their composition. 
There are limitations to our analysis. We have consid-
ered a small number of intervention and vaccination scenar-
ios, which should not be regarded as the only available 
options for policymakers. Our transmission model does not 
explicitly capture care home or hospital transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2, and is fit to each region of England separately 
rather than pooling information across regions and explicit-
ly modelling transmission between regions. There are also 
uncertainties in the choice of model used to generate these 
predictions, and the exact choice will yield differences in the 
measures needed to control the epidemic. We note that even 
without increased susceptibility of children to VOC 
202012/01, the more efficient spread of the variant implies 
that the difficult societal decision of closing schools will be a 
key public health question for multiple countries in the 
months ahead. 
We only assess relative support in the data for the 
mechanistic hypotheses proposed, but there may be other 
plausible mechanisms driving the resurgence of cases that 
we did not consider, and we have not identified the specific 
combination of mechanisms driving the increased transmis-
sion of VOC 202012/01. We identify increased transmissibil-
ity as the most parsimonious mechanistic explanation for 
the higher growth rate of VOC 202012/01, but a longer infec-
tious period also fits the data well (table S4) and is support-
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school closures were based on the assumption that children 
had reduced susceptibility and infectiousness compared to 
adults (19), but the precise values of these parameters and 
the impact of school closures remains the subject of scien-
tific debate (31). We based our assumptions about the effi-
cacy of NPIs on the measured impact on mobility of 
previous national lockdowns in England, but the impact of 
policy options cannot be predicted with certainty. 
Despite these limitations, we found strong evidence that 
VOC 202012/01 is spreading substantially faster than preex-
isting SARS-CoV-2 variants. Our modelling analysis suggests 
this difference could be explained by an overall higher infec-
tiousness of VOC 202012/01, but not by a shorter generation 
time or immune escape alone. Further experimental work 
will provide insight into the biological mechanisms for our 
observations, but given our projections of a rapid rise in 
incidence from VOC 202012/01—and the detection of other 
novel and highly-transmissible variants (25–28)—there is an 
urgent need to consider what new approaches may be re-
quired to sufficiently reduce the ongoing transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2. 
 
Materials and methods 
Summary of control measures in England in late 2020 
Following a resurgence of cases in September and October 
2020, a second national lockdown was implemented in Eng-
land, from 5 November to 2 December 2020. Restrictions 
included a stay-at-home order with exemptions for exercise, 
essential shopping, obtaining or providing medical care, 
education and work for those unable to work from home. 
Schools were kept open. Non-essential shops, retail and lei-
sure venues were required to close. Pubs, bars and restau-
rants were allowed to offer takeaway services only. 
Following the second national lockdown, regions in England 
were assigned to tiered local restrictions according to medi-
um, high and very high alert levels (Tiers 1, 2 and 3). In re-
sponse to rising cases in southeast England and concerns 
over VOC 202012/01, the UK government announced on 19 
December 2020 that a number of regions in southeast Eng-
land would be placed into a new, more stringent ‘Tier 4’, 
corresponding to a Stay at Home alert level. Tier 4 re-
strictions were broadly similar to the second national lock-
down restrictions. As cases continued to rise and VOC 
202012/01 spread throughout England, on 5 January 2021 a 
third national lockdown was introduced in England, with 
schools and universities closed and individuals advised to 
stay at home, with measures to be kept in place until at 
least mid-February 2021. 
 
Data sources 
To assess the spread of VOC 202012/01 in the United King-
dom, we used publicly-available sequencing-based data from 
the COG-UK Consortium (13) (5 February 2020–6 January 
2021) and Pillar 2 SARS-CoV-2 testing data provided by Pub-
lic Health England (1 October 2020–7 January 2021) for es-
timating the frequency of S gene target failure in England. 
COG-UK sequencing data for Northern Ireland were exclud-
ed due to low sample sizes. 
To assess the spread of VOC 202012/01 in Denmark, 
Switzerland and the USA, we used publicly available se-
quence data giving the incidence of VOC 202012/01 aggre-
gated by week and region provided by the Danish Covid-19 
Genome Consortium and the Statens Serum Institut (32) (15 
October 2020–28 January 2021), sequence and RT-PCR 
501Y.V1 rescreening data giving the incidence of VOC 
202012/01 in different regions of Switzerland provided by 
Christian Althaus and Tanja Stadler and the Geneva Univer-
sity Hospitals, the Swiss Viollier Sequencing Consortium 
from ETH Zürich, the Risch laboratory, the University Hos-
pital Basel, the Institute for Infectious Diseases, University 
of Bern and the Swiss National Covid-19 Science Task Force 
(33, 34) (2 November 2020–11 Feb 2021), and publicly avail-
able US nation-wide Helix SARS-CoV-2 Surveillance data, 
comprising both S-gene target failure data and randomly 
selected S-negative samples that were sequenced to infer the 
proportion of S-negative samples that were the VOC (35, 36) 
(6 September–11 February 2020). 
To estimate mobility, we used anonymised mobility data 
collected from smartphone users by Google Community 
Mobility (11). Percentage change in mobility per day was 
calculated for each lower-tier local authority in England and 
a generalised additive model with a spline for time was fit-
ted to these observations to provide a smoothed effect of the 
change in mobility over time (Fig. 1C). 
To estimate social contact rates (Fig. 1D), we used data 
on reported social contacts from the CoMix survey (12), 
which is a weekly survey of face-to-face contact patterns, 
taken from a sample of approximately 2500 individuals 
broadly representative of the UK population with respect to 
age and geographical location. We calculated the distribu-
tion of contacts using 1000 bootstrap samples with re-
placement from the raw data. Bootstrap samples were 
calculated at the participant level, then all observations for 
those participants are included in a sample to respect the 
correlation structure of the data. We collect data in two 
panels which alternate weekly, therefore we calculated the 
mean smoothed over the 2 week intervals to give a larger 
number of participants per estimate and account for panel 
effects. We calculated the mean number of contacts (face to 
face conversational contact or physical contact) in the set-
tings “home”, “work”, “education” (including childcare, 
nurseries, schools and universities and colleges), and “other” 
settings. We calculate the mean contacts by age group and 
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placed under Tier 4 restrictions on 20 December 2020 as 
they were experiencing high and rapidly increasing inci-
dence, and those areas of England that were not placed un-
der these restrictions). The mean number of contacts is 
influenced by a few individuals who report very high num-
bers of contacts (often in a work context). The means shown 
here are calculated based on truncating the maximum 
number of contacts recorded at 200 per individual per day. 
We compare Rt estimates derived from CoMix (12) to those 
derived from the REACT-1 prevalence survey (9) for Eng-
land. 
 
Statistical methods in brief 
Growth of VOC 202012/01 following initial phylogenetic ob-
servation. For each lineage i in the COG-UK dataset, we 
pool the number of sequences observed within that lineage 
across the UK for every day, t, yielding integer-valued se-
quence counts N(i, t). We estimate the time-varying expo-
nential growth rates of cases of each strain, r(i, t), using a 
negative binomial state-space model correcting for day-of-
week effects whose dispersion parameter was optimized for 
each strain by marginal likelihood maximization. We de-
fined the relativized growth rate of a lineage i at time t as 
ρ(i, t) = ( ) ( ) ( ), σrr i t r t t−   , where ( )r t  is the average 
growth rate of all circulating strains at time t and σr(t) the 
standard deviation of growth rates across all lineages at 
time t, such that ρ(i, t) is analogous to a z-statistic or Wald-
type statistic and allows comparison of growth rate differ-
ences across time when the average growth rate and scale of 
growth rate differences varies. 
Competitive advantage and increased growth rate of 
VOC-202012/01. To estimate the increase in growth rate of 
VOC 202012/01, we fitted a set of multinomial and binomial 
generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs), in which we es-
timated the rate by which the VOC displaces other resident 
SARS-CoV-2 variants across different regions in the UK, 
based on both the COG-UK sequence data as well as the S 
gene target failure data. In the analysis of the S gene target 
failure data, binomial counts were adjusted for the true pos-
itive rate. For comparison, we also calculated the growth 
advantage of the VOC in Denmark, Switzerland and the US 
based on both sequencing and S gene target failure data. All 
models took into account sample date and region plus, if 
desired, their interaction, and all mixed models took into 
account possible overdispersion and for the UK further in-
cluded local-tier local authority as a random intercept. From 
these models, we estimated the difference in Malthusian 
growth rate between other competing variants ∆r, as well as 
the expected multiplicative increase in basic reproduction 
number Rt and infectiousness, assuming unaltered genera-
tion time, which can be shown to be equal to exp(∆r.T), 
where T is the mean generation interval. The multiplicative 
increase being equal to exp(∆r.T) is an approximation that 
holds for a delta-distributed generation interval, but we 
show in the Supplementary Material that this is a good ap-
proximation for the gamma-distributed generation interval 
that we assume. In our calculations, we used estimated 
SARS-CoV-2 mean generation times T of either 5.5 days (14) 
(Table 1) or 3.6 days (37, 38) (table S1). 
Rt analysis. We calculated the weekly proportion of pos-
itive tests that were S-gene negative out of all positive tests 
that tested for the S-gene by English upper-tier local author-
ity. We used reproduction number estimates obtained using 
the method described in (37) and (39) and implemented in 
the EpiNow2 R package (40), downloaded from 
https://github.com/epiforecasts/covid-rt-estimates/blob/ 
master/subnational/united-kingdom-
local/cases/summary/rt.csv. We then built a separate model 
of the expected reproduction number in UTLA i during 
week t starting in the week beginning the 5 October 2020 as 
a function of local restrictions, mobility indicators, residual 
temporal variation, and proportion of positive tests with S 
gene target failure. The residual temporal variation is mod-
eled either as a region-specific thin-plate regression spline 
(“Regional time-varying”) or a static regional parameter 
(“Regional static”). The key estimand is the relative change 
in reproduction number in the presence of S gene target 
failure that is not explained by any of the other variables. 
 
Transmission dynamic model 
We extended a previously developed modelling framework 
structured by age (in 5-year age bands, with no births, 
deaths, or aging due to the short timescales modeled) and 
by geographical region (10, 15) to include two variants of 
SARS-CoV-2 (VOC 202012/01 and non-VOC 202012/01). The 
model is a discrete-time deterministic compartmental model 
which allows for arbitrary delay distributions for transitions 
between compartments. We fitted this model to multiple 
regionally-stratified data sources across the 7 NHS England 
regions as previously: deaths, hospital admissions, hospital 
bed occupancy, ICU bed occupancy, daily incidence of new 
infections, PCR prevalence of active infection, seropreva-
lence, and the daily frequency of VOC 202012/01 across each 
of the regions as measured by S gene target failure frequen-
cy corrected for false positives. The model assumes that in-
dividuals with clinical symptoms are more infectious than 
individuals with subclinical infection (19). We assume that 
vaccinated individuals have a lower probability of both clin-
ical and subclinical infection (fig. S9), but that vaccinated 
individuals who do develop clinical or subclinical infection 
are as infectious as unvaccinated individuals with clinical or 
subclinical infection. To model school closure, we removed 
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POLYMOD data and varying over time according to Google 
Mobility indices, as described previously (10). See supple-
mentary materials for details of Bayesian inference includ-
ing likelihood functions and prior distributions. 
Our individual transmission model fits to separate NHS 
regions of England produce independent estimates of pa-
rameters such as relative transmissibility and differences in 
odds of hospitalisation or death resulting from infection 
with VOC 202012/01. In order to produce overall estimates 
for these parameters, we model posterior distributions from 
individual NHS regions as draws from a mixture distribu-
tion, comprising a normally-distributed top-level distribu-
tion from which central estimates for each NHS region are 
drawn. We report the mean and credible intervals of the 
top-level distribution when reporting model posterior esti-
mates for England. 
In model fitting, we assume that our deterministic 
transmission model approximates the expectation over sto-
chastic epidemic dynamics. This is not exact (41) but the 
error in this approximation is small for the population-level 
processes we are modelling, as it decays with 1/N (42). This 
approach is well developed for state space models of com-
municable disease dynamics that fit an epidemic process to 
observed data via a stochastic observation process. 
 
Apparent growth of VOC 202012/01 not a result of 
testing artefacts 
The apparent frequency of VOC 202012/01 could be inflated 
relative to reality if this variant leads to increased test-
seeking behavior (e.g., if it leads to a higher rate of symp-
toms than preexisting variants). However, this would not 
explain the growth in the relative frequency of VOC 
202012/01 over time. Mathematically, if variant 1 has growth 
rate r1 and variant 2 has growth rate r2, the relative frequen-
cy over time is a2 exp(r2t) / (a1 exp(r1t) + a2 exp(r2t)), where 
a1 and a2 are the frequency of variant 1 and 2, respectively, 
at time t = 0. However, if variant 1 has probability x of being 
reported and variant 2 has probability y, and both have 
growth rate r, the relative frequency over time is a2 y exp(rt) 
/ (a1 x exp(rt) + a2 y exp(rt)), which is constant. 
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Table 1. Estimates of increased reproduction number for VOC 202012/01. Means and 95% CIs (GLMM) / 95% 
CrIs (Rt regression, transmission model) shown. GLMM models do not estimate a baseline growth rate or repro-







Data Geography Baseline 
growth rate 
Additive increase 




Multiplicative increase  
in reproduction number 
GLMM 1a Separate-slopes 
multinomial 
spline model* 
Sequence Regions of UK — 0.104 
[0.100, 0.108] 
—                       77%  
                   [73, 81] 
GLMM 1b Common-slope 
multinomial 
model* 
Sequence Lower-tier local author-
ities of UK 
— 0.093 
[0.091, 0.095] 
—                       67% 
                  [65, 69] 
GLMM 2h Separate-slope 
binomial spline 
model† 
S gene target 
failure‡ 
Regions of England — 0.109 
[0.107, 0.111] 
—                       83% 
                  [81, 84] 
Rt regression 4a Regional time-
varying baseline 
S gene target 
failure 
Upper-tier local author-







                      43% 
                  [38, 48] 
Rt regression 4b Regional static 
baseline 
S gene target 
failure 
Upper-tier local author-







                      57% 





S gene target 
failure‡ 






                      82% 
                 [43, 130]  
GLMM 3a Common-slope 
binomial model† 
Sequence Regions of Denmark — 0.080 
[0.067, 0.092] 
—                       55% 
                   [45, 66] 





Regions of Switzerland — 0.101 
[0.092, 0.109] 
—                       74% 
                   [66, 82] 
GLMM 3c Common-slope 
binomial model† 
S gene target 
failure‡ 
States of USA — 0.084 
[0.080, 0.088] 
—                       59% 
                   [56, 83] 
*VOC 202012/01 versus B.1.177.    †VOC 202012/01 versus all other variants.    ‡Binomial counts adjusted for the true positive rate (proportion of S gene target 
failures that are VOC 202012/01), estimated from misclassification model (for UK) or a binomial GLMM fitted to sequencing data of S gene target failures (for US). 
 
Table 2. Summary of projections for England, 15 December 2020–30 June 2021. 
 
 Moderate (October 2020) High (November 2020) with 
schools open 
High with schools closed     Very high (March 2020) 
No vaccination 
    Peak ICU (relative to 1st wave) 274% (256–292%) 162% (151–172%) 130% (122–136%) 119% (112–124%) 
    Peak ICU bed requirement 9,980 (9,330–10,600) 5,880 (5,490–6,280) 4,720 (4,450–4,960) 4,310 (4,070–4,530) 
    Peak deaths 3,960 (3,730–4,200) 2,050 (1,920–2,160) 1,500 (1,440–1,570) 1,830 (1,670–2,000) 
    Total admissions 635,000 (604,000–659,000) 454,000 (432,000–472,000) 448,000 (425,000–466,000) 450,000 (425,000–472,000) 
    Total deaths 216,000 (205,000–227,000) 146,000 (138,000–152,000) 147,000 (139,000–155,000) 149,000 (140,000–157,000) 
200,000 vaccinations per week 
    Peak ICU (relative to 1st wave) 269% (252–287%) 160% (149–170%) 130% (122–136%) 118% (112–124%) 
    Peak ICU bed requirement 9,790 (9,150–10,400) 5,810 (5,430–6,200) 4,710 (4,450–4,950) 4,310 (4,070–4,520) 
    Peak deaths 3,700 (3,500–3,920) 1,930 (1,820–2,040) 1,490 (1,430–1,550) 1,320 (1,280–1,380) 
    Total admissions 610,000 (580,000–634,000) 438,000 (416,000–454,000) 415,000 (394,000–430,000) 394,000 (373,000–413,000) 
    Total deaths 202,000 (192,000–213,000) 137,000 (130,000–143,000) 129,000 (123,000–135,000) 119,000 (112,000–125,000) 
2 million vaccinations per week 
    Peak ICU (relative to 1st wave) 236% (221–252%) 149% (139–158%) 128% (121–134%) 118% (111–124%) 
    Peak ICU bed requirement 8,590 (8,050–9,170) 5,400 (5,070–5,760) 4,650 (4,390–4,880) 4,290 (4,060–4,500) 
    Peak deaths 2,470 (2,330–2,610) 1,510 (1,450–1,580) 1,390 (1,340–1,450) 1,290 (1,250–1,340) 
    Total admissions 483,000 (459,000–502,000) 353,000 (337,000–366,000) 277,000 (265,000–287,000) 190,000 (182,000–197,000) 















Fig. 1. Rapid spread of VOC 202012/01 in England. (A) Proportion of S gene target failure among positive Pillar 2 
community SARS-CoV-2 tests in upper-tier local authorities of England from 1 October 2020–10 January 2021, sorted by 
latitude. (B) Spread of S gene target failure by age, index of multiple deprivation decile (1 = most deprived), and sex within 
Greater London. (C and D) Estimates of R0 from CoMix social contact survey (12) compared to Rt estimates from REACT-1 
prevalence survey (9) for England, with 90% CIs. Rt estimates based on single and aggregated REACT-1 survey rounds are 
shown. (E) Percentage change (95% CI) in Google Mobility indices relative to baseline over time and (F) setting-specific mean 
contacts (95% CI) from the CoMix study (12) over time and by age for Tier 4 local authorities compared to the rest of England. 
Tier 4 local authorities are areas within the South East, East of England, and London regions that were placed under stringent 
restrictions from 20 December 2020 due to high prevalence of VOC 202012/01 and growing case rates. Grey shaded areas 
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Fig. 2. Measuring the growth rate of VOC 202012/01. (A) Average relativized growth rate, i.e., a measure of variant fitness 
relative to other variants present during the 31 days following initial phylogenetic observation of a given variant, for all 
lineages in the COG-UK dataset, highlighting many lineages that have risen to prominence including B.1.177, the lineage with 
the highest relative abundance during the IPO of VOC 202012/01. The shaded regions show conservative 95% rejection 
intervals; VOC 202012/01 is the first strain to exceed this threshold of faster relativized growth. While many lineages exhibit 
above-average rates of growth, VOC 202012/01 has had the highest average relativized growth of any lineage in the history 
of COG-UK surveillance of SARS-COV-2. (B) Plotting all lineages’ relativized growth rates [ρ(t)] as a function of lineage age 
with conservative 95% rejection intervals highlights the significantly faster growth of VOC 202012/01 relative to other 
lineages at comparable times since their initial observation. Later declines in VOC and B.1.177 correspond to highly uncertain 
estimates of growth rates for data that are yet to be backfilled, and so these declines in ρ(t) are sensitive to the processing of 
future sequences from recent dates (fig. S1). (C) Muller plots of the relative abundances of the major SARS-CoV-2 variants in 
the UK, based on a multinomial spline fit to COG-UK sequence data (Table 1 and table S1, separate-slopes multinomial spline 
model). A model extrapolation until March 1 is shown (shaded area). Minority variants are 440 circulating SARS-CoV-2 
variants of low abundance. Specific colors represent the same lineages in panels A–C. (D) Mean reproduction number over 
7-day periods in 149 upper-tier local authorities of England (colored by the NHS England region they are within) plotted 
against the weekly proportion of Pillar 2 community SARS-CoV-2 tests with S gene target failure shows the spread of VOC 
202012/01, a corresponding increase in the reproduction number by local authority, and the eventual impact of targeted 
government restrictions from 20 December 2020. Testing data are shown for the week following the reproduction number 
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Fig. 3. Comparison of possible biological mechanisms underlying the rapid spread of VOC 202012/01. Each row shows a 
different assumed mechanism. (A) Relative frequency of VOC 202012/01 (black line and ribbon shows observed S gene 
target failure frequency with 95% binomial credible interval; purple line and ribbon shows mean and 95% credible interval 
from model fit). (B) Posterior estimates for relative odds of hospitalisation (severe illness), relative odds of ICU admission 
(critical illness), relative odds of death (fatal illness), growth rate as a multiplicative factor per week (i.e., exp(7·∆r)), and the 
parameter that defines the hypothesized mechanism; all parameters are relative to those estimated for preexisting variants. 
Illustrative model fits for the South East NHS England region: (C) fitted two-strain increased transmissibility model with VOC 
202012/01 included; (D) fitted two-strain increased transmissibility model with VOC 202012/01 removed; (E) fitted single-















Fig. 4. Projections of epidemic dynamics under different control measures. We compare four alternative scenarios for 
non-pharmaceutical interventions from 1 January 2021: (i) mobility returning to levels observed during relatively moderate 
restrictions in early October 2020; (ii) mobility as observed during the second lockdown in England in November 2020, 
then gradually returning to October 2020 levels from 1 March to 1 April 2021, with schools open; (iii) as (ii), but with school 
closed until 15 February 2021; (iv) as (iii), but with a lockdown of greater stringency as observed in March 2020 (fig. S20). 
(A) Without vaccination. (B) With 200,000 people vaccinated per week. (C) With 2 million people vaccinated per week. We 
assume that vaccination confers 95% vaccine efficacy against disease and 60% vaccine efficacy against infection, and 
that vaccination starts on 1 January 2021 with vaccine protection starting immediately upon receipt. This is intended to 
approximate the fact that vaccination started in early December, but that full protection occurs after a time lag and 
potentially after a second dose. Vaccines are given first to 70+ year olds until 85% coverage is reached in this age group, 
then to 60+ year olds until 85% coverage is reached in this age group, continuing into younger age groups in 10-year 
decrements. Resurgences starting in March 2021 are due to the relaxation of non-pharmaceutical interventions, including 
reopening schools (fig. S20). Median and 95% credible intervals are shown. The dotted lines in rows 2 and 3 show peak 
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